Just in case you haven't already read about this... Some researchers from Princeton have published a paper about methods which can be used to attack full-disk-encryption (FDE) schemes.
They have demonstrated that at least BitLocker (Windows Vista), FileVault (MacOS X) and dm-crypt (Linux) are vulnerable to this type of (partly hardware-based) attack scenarios. Quite likely lots of similar other solutions are vulnerable as well.
The main problem is that (contrary to popular belief) RAM does indeed retain its data for a non-trivial amount of time after power is cut (seconds, even minutes or hours if it's cooled down enough), so you can mount some new attacks such as:
Yes, all attacks assume that the attacker has physical access to your PC/RAM, in which case you already have several other problems. Still, the new thing about this is that even full-disk-encryption doesn't help much in some cases. You probably shouldn't depend too much on it (but you shouldn't stop using disk encryption either, of course!).
Full paper: coldboot.pdf. There are also some demo videos and pictures.
More coverage at Boing Boing, Bruce Schneier's weblog, Freedom to Tinker, Slashdot, Heise (German), and many more...
Make sure to read the comments of the various articles for more scenarios and possible ideas for how to prevent such attacks. Some ideas include enabling the BIOS RAM checks (which might explicitly erase RAM contents on reboot; that doesn't help in all cases, though) or using coreboot (previously LinuxBIOS) to erase RAM contents at boot-up and/or shutdown.
It's a highly non-trivial issue, though, there's no easy and complete fix so far. The only sure way is to not have your laptop or PC stolen and to not give attackers physical access to your computers.
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